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Abstract 
Ethnographic analogy, the use of comparative data from anthropology to inform 
reconstructions of past human societies, has a troubled history. Archaeologists often express 
concern about, or outright reject, the practice—and sometimes do so in problematically general 
terms. This is odd, as (or so I argue) the use of comparative data in archaeology is the same 
pattern of reasoning as the ‘comparative method’ in biology, which is a well-developed and 
robust set of inferences which play a central role in discovering the biological past. In pointing 
out this continuity, I argue that there is no ‘special pleading’ on the part of archaeologists in this 
regard: biologists must overcome analogous epistemic difficulties in their use of comparative 
data. I then go on to emphasize the local, empirically tractable ways in which particular 
ethnographic analogies may be licensed.  
1. Introduction 
There are similarities between contemporary and prehistoric human behavior, and so in 
principle the living can inform us about the dead. This thought underwrites ‘ethnographic 
analogy’: the appeal to anthropological reports of contemporary, usually hunter-gatherer 
behavior, in support of archaeological hypotheses. There are similarities between living 
organisms and past organisms, and so in principle the extant can inform us about the extinct. 
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This thought underwrites the ‘comparative method’: the appeal to contemporary biological facts 
to support biological hypotheses about the past. 
The comparative method is a well-developed, often quantified and rich set of epistemic 
techniques which are essential for reconstructing the biological past. By contrast, archaeologists 
often express concern, suspicion, or outright dismissal of (what they call) ethnographic 
analogies. Considering that (as we shall see) the two methods represent the same patterns of 
reasoning, this discrepancy is odd. Is there any reason for archaeologists, and not biologists, to 
worry about the use of comparative data? Is there ‘special pleading’ available to archaeologists 
which might justify such suspicion? I argue that no such case can be made. Just as in biology, the 
justification or otherwise of the use of comparative data is local and context dependent. My aim 
is to establish this point, and to make some progress on just what local and context dependent 
facts might matter. 
As we shall see, some archaeologists appear to be wary of ethnographies in principle. For 
example,  
… it can only be constantly restated that analogy does not provide answers, only models, 
hypotheses and ideas (Hayter 1992, 42). 
According to Holly Hayter, ethnographic analogies do not provide evidence, that is, they do 
not support archaeological hypotheses, but are limited to generating them. In section 4 I will 
focus on Hayter’s discussion of analogy, as it is a rather explicit example of the common attitude I 
target. In a similar vein, Lewis Binford (1967, 1977) also took a conservative view on the role of 
analogy in archaeology: 
Analogy serves to provoke certain types of questions which can, on investigation, lead to 
the recognition of more comprehensive ranges of order in the archaeological data 
(Binford, 1967, p10). 
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For Binford, then, analogy can ‘provoke questions’, but does not itself provide ‘answers’. 
When we see the continuities in the use of comparative biological data and comparative 
ethnographic data, it becomes clear that such positions are untenable. Ethnographic analogies 
certainly in principle have the goods to provide answers—that is, evidential support for 
hypotheses. Recent discussions of ethnographic analogy range from extreme caution or outright 
rejection (Hiscock 2007, Rednarek 2012, McCall 2007, Barrocall 2011), to more nuanced discussions 
(Gonzalez-Urquijo et al 2015, Ravn 2011, Whittaker & Tushingham 2014). My aim is to establish a 
view on the nuanced end: there is no outright rejection or acceptance of ethnographic analogy to 
be made, rather, for each case the devil is in the details. 
I’ll first introduce the comparative method with a paleoanthropological case study (section 
2), followed by a similar introduction to ethnographic analogy (section 3). In section 4 I argue 
against archaeological ‘special pleading’, that is, there is nothing different, as a matter of 
epistemic principle, between the biologist, paleoanthropologist, nor archaeologist when drawing 
such analogies. The interesting question, then, is under what conditions such inferences are 
licensed. 
Appropriately, then, I will discuss what is required to vindicate or damn a particular use of 
ethnographic analogy. In sections 4 and 5 I note that both ontic and epistemic issues can plague 
particular applications of comparative data. We must examine the strength and stability of our 
access to information, and investigate the properties of the systems we are examining: do they 
behave in a sufficiently regularly to support the inductions comparative data requires? I argue 
that even in troubling cases, where our information is poor and the systems behave irregularly, 
ethnographic evidence can still play an important role as one line of evidence involved in 
reconstructing the cultural past. I use recent work by Christine VanPool (2009) to illustrate how 
piece-meal, multi-leveled analyses of archaeological remains, drawing on ethnographic 
information, can lead to rich, well supported hypotheses. 
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Note that I am restricting myself to epistemic similarities and differences between 
archaeology and other sciences. There are important social, technological and financial 
differences which matter for how these sciences are practiced, but here I will focus on the 
patterns of reasoning involved.  
2. Hobbits & Hippos 
In this section I illustrate the comparative method with a paleoanthropological case study. H. 
floresiensis were a surprising addition to the hominid family tree. Around 13 individuals were 
found at a single site on the Indonesian island of Flores, which they inhabited up until around 
14,000 years ago (Brown et al 2004, Moorwood et al 2005). Their most striking feature is 
diminutive size—adults reach a paltry 1 meter tall—earning them the inevitable ‘hobbit’ epithet. 
In addition to their stature, they also sport ‘primitive1’ features: low encephalization (that is, 
brain-size/body-size ratio), arboreal adaptations and incomplete bipedalism. H. floresiensis’ 
taxonomic grouping is mysterious: do their features signal a remarkable story of late hominid 
evolutionary adaptability, or a remarkable story of early hominid radiation and survival? Are the 
hobbits late hominids gone dwarf, or the last remnant of a hitherto unknown migration of early 
hominids? These hypotheses provide contrasting explanations of H. floresiensis’ traits, which 
illustrate an essential distinction in the comparative method. 
By the ‘early hominid’ hypothesis, hobbits are the ancestors of a primitive hominid radiation 
out of Africa, perhaps Homo habilis (Jungers 2009, Wong 2009). H. floresiensis and H. habilis share 
traits: they are small, low in encephalization, walk stooped, and suit partially arboreal lifestyles. 
By this hypothesis, hobbit traits are the result of retained, ancestral features. They are 
                                                             
1 Here, ‘primitive’ is certainly no insult to H. floresiensis, rather that some of its traits are associated 
with the base of the hominid line. 
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homologues. Two traits are homologous when they are inherited from a common ancestor2. By 
this hypothesis, then, H. floresiensis and H. habilis’ traits signal their ancestral relatedness and 
their similarity is explained in terms of that ancestry. What’s wrong with the ‘early hominid’ 
theory? There is no evidence of habiline hominids radiating into Asia: it was the taller, upright and 
more highly encephalized H. ergaster, H. erectus and H. heidelbergensis who took the hominid 
torch out of Africa. 
The ‘late hominid’ theory places the divergence between H. floresiensis and the hominid line 
much later—by this theory their ancestors were erectine and their problematic traits are 
adaptations to their island environment (Argue et al 2009). Like the pygmy elephants of Flores, 
the hobbits could be insular dwarves. By this hypothesis, the relationship between the traits of H. 
habilis and H. floresiensis is homoplastic, rather than homologous: the hobbits did not inherit their 
low encephalization, but rather it evolved via island dwarfism. Homoplastic traits are convergent: 
rather than tracing ancestry, they trace evolutionary pressure or other influences3. What’s wrong 
with the ‘late hominid’ theory? Standard models of dwarfism do not predict some hobbit features 
(Martin et al 20064, Jungers et al 2009). For instance, it is thought that insular dwarfism is 
expressed developmentally via shorter growth periods. The difference between a pygmy 
elephant and a whopper, by this line, is growing time. However, different parts of the body 
complete growth earlier than others—specifically, brain development completes earlier than 
body growth. If dwarfism is the result of less growing time, then we should expect dwarves to be 
more encephalized than their bulky cousins, as the brain had time to mature while the body’s 
growth was cut short. On this model, H. floresiensis’ brain should be twice the actual size.  
                                                             
2 This is a version of a taxic definition of homology, definitions of homology are highly contentious 
(see, for instance, Brigandt & Griffiths 2007, Currie 2014, Hall 2003, Ramsey & Paterson 2012), but this does 
not affect the nature of the inference considered here. 
 
3 Like homology, ‘homoplasy’ definitions are contentious (see Currie 2014, Pearce 2012, Powell 2012)—
but again, this need not concern us now. 
4 Note that Martin et al do not endorse an early hominid model, but rather argue that the features are 
pathological: ‘H. florersiensis’ are H. sapiens. See also Jacob et al 2006.  
6 
 
Which hypothesis is more likely: are the hobbit traits inherited homologues, or homoplastic? 
Were they habiline or erectine? Most obviously, this depends on whether a habiline ‘ghost’ 
radiation or an erectine dwarf with hobbit-like features is more plausible. However, there is more 
to this than meets the eye—let’s start with the ‘early hominid’ hypothesis. 
The ‘early hominid’ hypothesis involves what has been called a phylogenetic (or homologous) 
inference (see Levy & Currie 2014, Currie 2015). In such inferences, common features are taken to 
be indicative of common ancestry, or common ancestry is taken to be evidence of common traits. 
In this case we infer from the similarities between early hominids and H. floresiensis to their 
having a shared ancestry. An example of the latter would be to appeal to other facts about early 
hominids to infer further hobbit traits, say that H. floresiensis used the stone-flake based Olduwan 
tool-set on the basis of their (presumed) habiline ancestors using them. The success of such 
inferences turn on: 
(1) How similar are the traits, and are they similar in relevant respects5? Obviously, brute 
quantitative similarity has its part to play, but typically, biologists prefer some traits more 
than others. For instance, traits that are less likely to be affected by selection pressure. 
Traits related to climbing, for instance, are frequently excluded from reconstructions of 
monkey phylogenies, as these are highly likely to be homoplastic, and thus too noisy for 
taxonomic purposes (see Hall 2007). 
(2) How labile are the traits? That is, over evolutionary time, should we expect the trait in 
question to remain stable, or change? Traits under intense and steady maintenance (or 
‘stabilizing’) selection are likely to remain stable. Moreover, canalized ‘generatively 
entrenched’ (Wimsatt 1986) traits will also resist change. Others are more labile, and thus 
problematic. The dramatic changes in hominid brain size over our evolution suggests that 
                                                             
5 Remane (1952) provides five criteria for identifying homologues. Some of these stretch the notion of 
‘similarity’ somewhat: i.e., some depend on the relative positions of the homologues rather than similarity 
in character states. I take being similar in ‘relevant respects’ to capture these non-character-state-based 
notions. 
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encephalization is labile in hominids, and this underwrites caution about inferring 
ancestry from that trait alone. 
(3) What is the temporal distance? The amount of time between homologues matters for the 
stability of homologous inferences. For short distances, labile traits could remain stable, 
whereas over long distances only the most entrenched will. 
And so, in addition to the plausibility of a habiline ghost lineage, the evidential support for 
the ‘early hominid’ hypothesis depends on the relevant similarity and lability of the traits in 
question. Let’s move to the ‘late hominid’ hypothesis. 
Recall that, by the ‘late hominid’ hypothesis, H. floresiensis were of erectine stock, but 
evolved shorter stature (and other traits) while adapting to the environment of Flores. As 
opposed to inferring across ancestry, we here appeal to a model which links particular traits to 
certain adaptive environments in a particular developmental context. That is, the inference relies 
on a model claiming that, for hominids, adaptation to island environments could plausibly lead to 
the hobbit’s traits (Currie 2013). The objection to the late hominid hypothesis just is that the 
model of island dwarfism does not do this. So, how is that model sanctioned? 
Weston & Lister (2009) appeal to other mammalian dwarves to test this developmental 
model, suggesting that H. floresiensis could have been erectine after all (see Lieberman 2009 for a 
summary). The key is noticing that the model of island dwarfism does not merely predict high 
encephalization in hobbits, but across a range of island-dwelling lineages. Assuming that those 
lineages are relevantly hobbit-like, they can be used to test the model. Weston & Lister do just 
this, comparing two lineages of extinct pygmy hippopotamus and an extinct pygmy elephant to 
full sized variants. Happily for the ‘late hominid’ hypothesis, body size and encephalization in 
those lineages bucks the model’s trend. This shows that dwarfism is not always expressed via the 
retardation of later ontogenetic processes—there must be some processes by which brain 
growth decreases more than body growth. Montgomery & Mundy (2013) have suggested that 
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dwarfism could occur via the gestation period remaining fixed, but fetal development slowing. 
This could cause early developing traits such as brains and teeth to be more affected than late 
developing traits. Their model was also supported by an analogue: appeal to the diminutive 
teeth-size to body-size ratio of pygmy marmosets6. 
And so, some inferences rely on models which apply to more than just our target—and 
appealing to these other cases can serve to test and refine the model. In a comparative context, 
these typically take the following schematic form: 
Across phylogenetic group x (in environment w), feature y correlates with feature z7. 
For instance, Martin et al’s model claimed that, across mammals, dwarfism correlates with 
increased encephalization. We can test such models by examining members of x in w with 
feature y—pygmy hippos dwelling in island environments in this case; the model is undermined if 
z is not present. How effective is this? This depends on: 
(1) What is the phylogenetic distance between the traits?  Lineages with similar 
developmental systems are more likely to respond similarly to selective or other 
environmental pressures than those with different developmental systems. Phylogenetic 
relatedness is a proxy for this. Martin et al, for instance, could complain that their model 
is only supposed to be applicable to hominid dwarfs, not Afrotheria. For this to bite, they 
would need to make it plausible that the two phylogenetic groups are likely to diverge in 
that respect8. 
                                                             
6 A broader approach is taken by Bromham & Cardillo (2007). They test the ‘island rule’, that larger 
animals lose size and smaller animals gain size on islands, across many primates. They find that the hobbit’s 
gross body size fits within the island rule’s range. 
7 See Currie’s (2015) parallel discussion of ‘bracketed models’ for more.  
8 Currie (2013) calls this ‘scope’. 
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(2) How similar are the relevant features9? In this case, we are concerned with testing the 
ontogenetic expression of island dwarfism. For instance, Montgomery’s appeal to pygmy 
marmosets could be undermined as they evolved in the Amazon Basin, not on an island. 
Although both they and Weston & Lestor’s hippos are dwarfs, it could be that pygmy 
marmosets are not dwarfs by the relevant cause10.  
(3) Number of data points: how many independent couplings of y and z are there in x? Taken 
alone, Weston & Lestor’s evidence shows that Martin et al’s model does not always apply, 
and so dwarfism is possible in H. floresiensis—but we would need to see more examples, 
and across a wider range of the relevant phylogenetic group (particularly primates), to 
say anything stronger. 
And so, we can identify two general kinds of comparative inference. The first, homologous 
inference, either infers traits from ancestry, or ancestry from traits. The second, homoplastic 
inference, supports models that couple features (sometimes traits to other traits, sometimes 
traits to environments) by appealing to analogues as data points. One critical difference is that 
homologous inferences are token-level or individual, while homoplastic inferences are type-level. 
That is to say, homologous inferences are concerned only with the individual lineage containing 
the homologues: the inference follows a line of ancestry. In contrast, homoplastic inferences 
consider the case as an instance of a particular class—the analogues are unified via a model 
coupling the lineages’ features. Homoplastic traits are instances of a type of event; homologous 
traits are parts of an historical individual. 
 I hope it is obvious that the applicability of these two inference patterns are sensitive to 
context. Although we can discuss what the licence depends on, there is nothing to say about 
whether homologous or homoplastic inferences are licenced overall. The licence of the 
                                                             
9 Currie (2013) call this ‘grain’. 
10 I doubt this: the Amazon Basin quite possibly is an island for ecological purposes, and moreover it is 
hard to see how a difference in the cause of the selection pressure could affect how the trait is expressed 
ontogenetically.  
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inferences depends on the factors I identified, and those factors are local: the temporal distance, 
the similarity of the traits, the lability, and so forth. It is time to turn to archaeology. As we shall 
see, ethnographic analogy follows just the same structure as we have just seen for the 
comparative method. 
3. Stones & Shaman 
Painted images on natural stone, ‘rock’ or ‘parietial’ art, are widespread human artifacts that 
provide enticing, but ambiguous, insights into the lifeways of those who made them. 
Archaeological studies of rock art have focused on European and South African cases, but have 
drawn on ethnographic studies as wide spread as Australia, North America and Papua New 
Guinea in addition to African sources (see Chippendale & Taccon 1998). There are, essentially, 
two questions about rock art. First, what explains rock art? How does it fit into a chronology of 
human cultural development? Second, and relatedly, what does rock art signal? What can it tell us 
about past human cultures? Answers to the first question inform the second, and support 
reconstructions. For instance, the cultural-historical archaeology of the 1950s and earlier 
understood the phenomenon in terms of innate human creativity: rock art was an expression of 
feelings. As it was assumed that such expressions were specific to cultures, they were taken to 
track chronology and ethnicity (Beroccal 2011). For the ‘new archaeologists’, by contrast, making 
rock art was an adaptive behavior, in the business of transmitting important information (Conkey 
& Hastorf 1990). If that is right, then rock art can signal past social structures. The functionalists, 
structuralists and Marxists of the 60s and 70s emphasized rock art’s role in maintaining social 
order. Here, shamanism came to the fore (Lewis-William 1995).  
Two contexts matter here: South Africa and Europe. Since the 1970s South African 
archaeologists had more interest in, and respect for, indigenous people. Where previously a kind 
of euro-centrism saw hypotheses about Paleolithic European rock art transported into African 
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contexts, this stream was reversed. Some indigenous African people, the San in particular, have 
shamanistic practices (but do not create rock art). A key part of shamanism is the use of motifs to 
symbolize spiritual information. Such motifs are expressed in story and dance—and, when rock 
art and shamanism overlap—rock art. For South African archaeologists, then, these motifs 
became a bridge between contemporary shamanistic practices and rock art—and thus from the 
art to the ancient artists themselves. And so, although the modern San do not themselves create 
rock art, it is thought that there is both cultural and environmental continuity between them and 
the ancient, rock-art producing cultures archaeologists want to understand, and that this is 
sufficient to justify using San shamanistic practice to inform interpretation. 
Researchers now interpret specific panels in terms of well-documented symbols of 
potency, metaphors of trance experience, significant human and animal postures, 
entopic phenomena, and hallucinations experienced by San shamans. As this work 
proceeds, we learn more and more about the ‘syntax’ and ‘vocabulary’ of the art and are 
thus able to ‘read’ increasingly complex painted texts. Each elucidation deepens our 
understanding of San thought and religious experience and so provides hitherto 
unattainable insights into the ideology of the now-extinct painters (Lewis Williams 1989 
pp166). 
Detailed studies of San ethnographies, then, provide the language of shamanistic motif, 
which is then applied to the rock art in question. This is an example of what archaeologists call a 
‘direct’ analogy: 
Ethnographic information can also be direct, when both the archaeological and 
ethnographic contexts share a common geographic setting and a potential cultural 
connection exists between them (Berrocal 2011, pp 6). 
An important part of the justification here is the hypothesized continuity between the 
contemporary San, or near-contemporary in the case of 19th Century ethnographic reports, and 
the rock artists 3,000 years earlier. Further justification is provided by similarities between the 
rock art and shamanistic stories, roughly, the capacity of shamanistic motifs to explain otherwise 
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baffling features of rock art (Lewis-Williams’ 1989 discussion of the meaning of Elan imagery is a 
striking example). 
As I make explicit in section 4, there are structural similarities between the direct analogy 
connecting the San and ancient African artists, and the homologous inference between H. 
floresiensis and its habiline ancestors. Both infer, on the basis of relevant similarities, along lines 
of ancestry. The inferred continuity between cultural groups on the one hand, and between 
phylogenies on the other, both underlie the reconstruction.  
And so, in South Africa, shamanism is used to explain the features of ancient rock art and is 
supported by the claim that San are a cultural/geographically continuous people with the rock 
artists. These ideas were then transplanted into Europe, where the inference took on a rather 
different character (note that the claims that the San can inform interpretation of South African 
rock art, and that the same ethnographies can inform European rock art are different, and not 
mutually exclusive). 
In Europe, the shaman hypothesis received a neuro-psychological spin (Lewis-Williams 1991, 
2004, Lewis-Williams & Dowson 1988). A long-standing puzzle in European rock art is the 
meaning behind ‘entropic’ (that is, simple patterned rather than overtly depictive) motifs. It is 
suggested that these are caused by shamans directly representing hallucinogenic experiences on 
the rock. There are regularities in human perception during altered states of consciousness, and 
these in combination with Shamanistic practices are taken to explain Paleolithic rock art.  
This is an example of an ‘indirect’ analogy: although there is no continuous cultural or 
geographical connection between the San and European rock artists, it is nonetheless thought 
that the connection between rock art and Shamanism in a South African context can be 
transported into Europe in light of human psychological continuities. As evidence once more we 
have the level of similarity between the rock art (these are sometimes referred to as ‘formal 
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analogies’) and the capacity of the rock art to explain otherwise befuddling aspects of European 
rock art, such as entropic motifs.  
And so, two different inferences are performed. First, a direct analogy is drawn between San 
ethnographies and South African rock art; the ‘language’ of contemporary San motif expressed in 
story, dance and ritual is extended to the rock art. Second, an indirect analogy is drawn between 
shamanistic practices and European rock art. Here, a model connecting shamanism to rock art is 
used, partly licensed by an underlying psychological model, by similarities between rock art in 
Europe and South Africa, and the success of the model in explaining otherwise strange features 
of the motifs.  
The suggestion that Paleolithic art is explicable via analogy with the San is similar to the 
hypothesized relationship between H. floresiensis and other island dwarfs. In both cases, the 
target is taken to be a token of a type: the former is an instance of shamanistic motif, the latter 
an instance of island dwarfism. Seen in this light, the regularities applying to these instances (the 
meaning of entropic motifs, or the developmental models of dwarfism) are applicable to the 
targets. 
The use of ethnographies to inform rock art interpretation has been heavily criticized, both in 
its direct and indirect application. These objections are examples of the more general charges I 
discuss in section 4. Rednarik (2012) puts this all rather starkly: 
…I am most pessimistic about our prospects in most of these areas, and in particular, I 
perceive very little scientific benefit in most traditional [ethnographic] approaches to 
rock arts. It is not the role of true science to create, reinforce and perpetuate 
mythologies about the way the world is. Rednarik (2012) p 224 
First, data about the analogue itself has come under fire. Characterizations of ‘shamanistic’ 
practices in South Africa are largely drawn from San ethnographies and 19th Century 
ethnohistories of the /Xam (McCall 2007). The trustworthiness of this information has been 
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questioned, both considering its antiquity and possible biases (Bahn 1997, Solomon 1998). As 
Berrocal puts it: 
… [such ethnographies] might privilege the vision of a specific individual or group of 
individuals over the rest of the group, by focusing on the one particular meaning 
available. Meaning is polysemous and the relation between meaning and material sign is 
not univocal within the same social group. Knowledge may be unevenly distributed inside 
the social group. Therefore, there is the danger that ethnographic records might be 
biased, masking differences in knowledge and/or power (12). 
Not only might ethnographies be marred due to non-ideal data gathering, but Berrocal 
emphasizes that multiple meanings frequently exist amongst a group that are obscure to outside 
observers. The difficulty of capturing this diversity leads to biases. A second line of attack tackles 
the idea that ‘shamanism’ represents a unified cultural ‘type’ that one may infer across (see 
Layton 2000). McCall argues forcefully for this: 
In seeking to interpret rock art using universal features of cosmology and religious 
practice, it is highly generalizing. It denies the importance of regional historical and social 
contexts in determining symbolic practices. In seeking singular meanings for inherently 
polysemous symbols, it clearly lacks the kind of multivocality that has become a key 
feature of post-processual approaches (226). 
Roughly, according to McCall, if hunter-gatherer religious practices are deeply disunified and 
heterogeneous, then similarities between their material remains are no guide to similarities in 
their cultural practices.  
A third, and related, worry is about interpretation. The shift from rock art to cultural practice 
relies on inferring the art’s meaning—and meaning is tricky. As Smith puts it: 
Perhaps the greatest difficulty in getting at the meaning of prehistoric art is that we do 
not know the symbolic conceptions which were involved even in naturalistic 
representations.  Are these to be taken literally, that is as signs?  Or are they loaded 
symbols, part of a code to be broken? (1968, p.30). 
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Human-made symbols admit many possible meanings—and getting an epistemic grip on 
these meanings is difficult. If there is no way for us to narrow the space of possible hypotheses, 
then we could be stuck at an empirical dead-end. 
Note that the scope of these objections is unclear. Are archaeologists merely sounding a note 
of caution about the use of shamanistic ethnographies, are they claiming that such inferences are 
invalid in these particular circumstances, or are these applications of more general, in principle, 
arguments ethnographic analogy? Both direct and indirect analogies have come under three 
kinds of fire: the trustworthiness of the source, the idea that ‘shamanism’ is a good category, and 
the issue of interpretation. On the face of it, these objections tend towards the general rather 
than the specific—there are overarching reasons to worry about ethnographic analogies which 
undermine particular uses. It is my task in the next two sections to shift such objections to the 
specific. As we shall see, if shamanistic analogies are problematic (or, for that matter, kosher), 
this needs to be shown via a detailed examination of the particular circumstance. 
4. Special Pleading? 
In this section I examine archaeological objections to ethnographic analogies in terms of the 
comparative method. There are two conclusions, first, there are no grounds for archaeological 
‘special pleading’, that is, there is nothing prima facie different about the target of archaeological 
research—the archaeologist answers the same charges as the biologist. Second, license is 
provided on a case-by-base fashion. My aim here is neither to vindicate nor damn ethnographic 
analogy: I am neutral about the evidential worth of any particular instance of it. Rather, I am 
targeting what must be shown if ethnographic analogies are to be especially troublesome, and 
when they can be considered valid evidence. Special pleading could take two forms: first, there 
might be qualitative, in-principle differences between archaeological and biological targets; 
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second, there could be qualitative differences: archaeological targets could be more intransigent 
epistemically speaking. I will discuss both.  
My way into these questions is via a comparison with the comparative method, so it is worth 
making explicit their commonality: the comparative method and ethnographic analogies are 
instances of the same patterns of reasoning. The argument is summarized in table 1.  
 
Pattern of 
Reasoning 
Targets 
conceived as… 
Validity turns on… 
Homologous 
Inference / 
Direct 
Ethnographic 
Analogy 
Inference along 
historical 
continuity 
Token-level 
 Relevant Similarity 
 Lability of trait 
 Temporal Distance 
Homoplastic 
Inference / 
Indirect 
Ethnographic 
Analogy 
Inference via a 
model linking 
traits to other 
features 
(constrained to a 
context) 
Type-Level 
 Phylogenetic distance 
 Relevant similarity 
 Number of data-points 
 
First, compare a homologous inference to a direct ethnographic analogy. According to the 
‘early hominid’ hypothesis, H. floresiensis is habiline on the basis of their shared features, and the 
idea that it is plausible that a line of biological inheritance connects the two. According to the 
African shaman hypothesis, African rock art is explained by shamanistic practices, on the basis of 
the shared features of San ritual motifs and those from rock art, and the plausibility of a line of 
cultural inheritance between them. Both homologous inferences and direct analogies infer along 
lines of inheritance, their plausibility turns on (relevant) similarity and—and this is important—
how labile we ought to expect the feature in question to be. 
Second, compare a homoplastic inference to an indirect ethnographic analogy. The ‘late 
hominid’ hypothesis treats H. floresiensis as an erectine gone island dwarf, on the basis that, 
across the mammalian phylogenetic group, dwarfism correlates with the suite of traits expressed 
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in H. floresiensis. On the European shaman hypothesis, Palaeolithic rock art is explained in 
shamanistic terms, on the basis of a model that in humans (due in part to continuities in the 
perceptual effects of altered consciousness) shamanism correlates with features of rock art. 
Both homoplastic inferences and indirect ethnographic analogies work by supporting models 
linking features within certain constraints, that is, they are conceived on the type-level. Their 
plausibility is based on how likely the constraints are—that is, how similar ought we expect the 
critters in that group to be, how many independent data points there are for the model, and the 
level and type of similarity. 
In terms of brute evidential reasoning, then, an ethnographic analogy is simply an example of 
the comparative method applied to archaeology. This is, I think, unsurprising: after all, Wylie 
(1985) has shown that ethnographic analogy can be understood in terms of the logic of 
analogous reasoning in general, and moreover I have operated at such a coarse grain of analysis 
that it is easy to unify things. However, I think important upshots emerge from this point. With a 
link established between archaeology and biology, we can re-examine and reconceptualise 
general objections to ethnographic analogy. By doing so, I show that such general objections are 
misplaced, and point to which details would help us ascertain the licence of a particular 
inference. 
4.1 Interpretation 
Archaeologists study the remains of incredibly complex critters who arrange themselves into 
very complex systems—societies—and one of the tricky things about these critters is their 
intentions: humans have goals, aims and reasons. This means that if material remains are to be 
inroads to past human lifeways, they need to be interpreted. But interpretation is difficult 
because human intention is so diverse. Yes, the Elan is a central motif in San shamanistic 
practices, representing the power of the entranced shaman, but why should I think this is true of 
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a painting of an Elan—perhaps the painter just liked Elan, or Elan represented something else? 
Moreover, how we interpret the Elan is highly dependent on our background theories: if I am in a 
‘new archaeology’ frame of mind I will approach the art asking what kinds of adaptive 
information could be contained within it, while if I am influenced by structuralism I might ask how 
it could serve to reinforce social order. What is interpreted depends vitally on facts about the 
interpreter. 
Problems of interpretation are best understood as problems of underdetermination. 
Underdetermination is standardly a relationship between theories and evidence: two theories are 
underdetermined just in case there is insufficient evidence to discriminate between them. We can 
distinguish between ‘in principle’ underdetermination: where the empirical consequences of two 
theories are identical, and ‘transient’ underdetermination, where current evidence does not 
distinguish between hypotheses (Turner 2005, Stanford 2009, Sklar 1977). Surely archaeological 
hypotheses are not underdetermined in principle: presumably we do sometimes work out what 
the past intentions of human actors were. Problems of interpretation should be read as the 
worry that we don’t have (and are not likely to get) enough evidence to satisfactorily empirically 
distinguish between the live options.  
Problems of underdetermination are certainly not unique to archaeology. Consider the two 
competing paleoanthropological hypotheses from section 2. To claim that hobbits are erectine or 
habiline requires differing interpretations of the remains’ features.  That is, the features alone 
don’t speak either way. It is only in virtue of background theory that material remains gain 
evidential relevance, no matter what the context. Biologists have developed criteria for spotting, 
say, when two traits are homologues or homoplasies. These criteria are rich and certainly not 
theoretically innocent; they must be interpreted, and some of the issues are extremely subtle. 
Does this halt progress in biology? It does not seem so.  
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And so, if interpretation ought to be read in terms of underdetermination, there isn’t any in 
principle special pleading on the behalf of archaeologists here. However, might there be 
something different in quantity, if not kind. That is, might underdetermination problems be 
particularly pressing for ethnographic analogies? Well, under what circumstances should we 
expect underdetermination to be particularly prevalent? Here are some thoughts. 
First, notice that underdetermination has two sources. Call one source ‘evidential’ 
underdetermination. Here we know what would decide between our hypotheses, but the 
evidence just isn’t available. Say we found evidence of a H. habilis radiation, or a sequence of 
finds providing an evolutionary sequence from erectine ancestors to H. floresiensis. That, 
probably, would decide the hobbit debate one way or the other. However, such conclusive 
evidence isn’t available. Call the other ‘midrange’ underdetermination. I’m using ‘midrange’ in 
reference to Binford’s ‘middle-range theory’ (Kosso 2000, Binford 1977); these are theories which 
grant observational reports evidential relevance. A paleobiological example of midrange theory is 
taphonomy, the science of fossilization. Fossils are evidentially relevant to extinct lineages in 
virtue of our understanding of fossilization formation which taphonomy provides. For Lewis-
Williams, it is in virtue of both the underlying psychological theory and the model connecting 
cave art to shamanism that South African San ethnography is evidentially relevant to Paleolithic 
society. If we are uncertain of our midrange theory, or such theory is incomplete, then we don’t 
even know which observations could be decisive either way. If we didn’t know how fossils 
formed, then it would be very difficult to know how to use aspects of fossil morphology to 
distinguish between different hypotheses about past lineages. This is because understanding 
fossil formation is often necessary to split the informative biological signal from features which 
are due to geological or environmental influence after the organism’s death. I suspect that this 
kind of worry is the one which motivates archaeologists concerned about interpretation. That is, 
we do not have the requisite theories required to know what evidence could distinguish between 
various interpretive hypotheses.   
20 
 
And so, the claim that ethnographic analogies are particularly prone to underdetermination 
could be driven by the thought that (1) good ethnographies would be great evidence, but they 
just aren’t available (evidential underdetermination), or (2) we just don’t have the theories 
required to link ethnographies to past human societies (midrange underdetermination). 
Interestingly, these options are intimately linked to the next two challenges I am to discuss. The 
first is about how good our evidence about ethnographies is, the second is about the kinds of 
systems human societies might be and how this affects the relevance of ethnographic data. If I 
am right, then complaints about interpretation actually either boil down to worries about 
uniformitarian principles—human societies are just the wrong kinds of systems; or worries about 
sufficiency of evidence. Let’s turn to those issues. 
4.2 Uniformitarianism 
There are a wide variety of uniformitarian principles. Basically, they tell us that a phenomena, 
force, or regularity from some domain also operates in another. In a sense, Newton’s arguments 
for universal gravitation—that the mathematics representing forces on pulleys and weights also 
represented the relationships between celestial bodies—was uniformitarian. Typically, though, 
the term is related to 19th Century geologists such as Lyell, who argued that we ought to use the 
kind of small-scale geological processes we see now (erosion, for instance) to explain geological 
form—a slow and steady approach to explanation which heavily influenced Darwin. Some kind of 
uniformitarian principle is necessary to license ethnographic analogy, but it is very important to 
get clear on what type. 
Some complaints against ethnographic analogy assume that they require a kind of general 
uniformitarianism. Holly Hayter is a good example, she argues that: 
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There are a number of problems involved in the use of ethnographic analogy. Basically, 
these problems lie in the various underlying uniformitarian, environmental-deterministic 
notions upon which the notion of analogy is based. (47-48). 
In other words, analogies require uniformitarian—that is, deterministic—connections 
between environments and human culture. But there aren’t deterministic connections between 
environments and human culture, again quoting Hayter: 
…ethnographic studies have only proved that there are an incredible amount of different 
codes of behavior practiced by many groups throughout the world. There are 
insurmountable factors involved in structuring human behavior: no one practice can be 
narrowed down to environmental, social, or biological factors. There are no such things 
as cultural laws… (44-45). 
Human cultural groups, then, are too complex for simple deterministic inferences from 
environment to culture to hold—human systems are path-dependent, interdependent, and 
highly context-sensitive. In virtue of this, such systems are not amenable to strict uniformitarian 
treatments. Hayter is right about this. Moreover, as we saw earlier, she and other archaeologists 
might also be right to put pressure on the notion that ‘shaman’ or ‘hunter-gatherer’ are good 
categories. They may be gerrymandered collections of disparate cultural and subsistence 
practices. However, there are two fundamental errors here: first, in thinking that ethnographic 
analogies (direct or indirect) require deterministic connections between environment and 
culture; second, that they require robust categories like ‘hunter-gatherer’. To see why, let’s re-
examine the relationship between hobbits and hippos. 
The homologous inference from H. floresiensis’s traits to a habiline ancestry relied on an 
uniformitarian principle: we could call this ‘phylogenetic inertia’ (Griffiths 1996, Levy & Currie 
2015). Phylogenetic inertia, taken generally, says that traits are likely to remain stable over time; it 
provides a general license to think biological traits are not (very) labile. Such a principle could be 
motivated by evolutionary theory. In order for complex traits to cumulatively evolve, avenues of 
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inheritance must be fairly robust, and so we should expect inertia. Hopefully it is immediately 
obvious that this principle is more applicable for some traits than others, as inheritance channels 
differ in their robustness. This is why investigating the lability of a trait matters. Phylogenetic 
inertia, then, is no deterministic principle. The use of pygmy hippos to test the model of insular 
dwarfism in H. floresiensis also didn’t require that there be any deterministic relationships: things 
are more subtle than that. It produced evidence that the model of insular dwarfism applied to the 
hobbits was faulty.  
And so, analogous evidence in no way requires commitment to strong deterministic 
principles—but, as we shall see in 5.2, working out how robust the relevant inheritance channels 
are (in the direct case) and how determinate the material-remain/cultural regularities are (in the 
indirect case) is extremely important for licencing an ethnographic analogy. 
Moreover, using ethnographic analogies does not require robust unified categories like 
‘hunter-gatherer’. Remember, an ethnographic analogy links a material remain with a cultural 
product (or a cultural product with another) either through a model, or along lines of ancestry. In 
neither case do we need the categories to be unified in a deep way. Hippopotamus and Hominids 
are very different kinds of critters. We do not need for them to fall within some general category 
for their use in a homoplastic inference: they just need to be similar in the relevant respects. Even 
if there are enormous differences between so-called ‘hunter-gatherer’ groups, what matters for 
ethnographic analogy is the robustness of the relevant similarities. 
The lesson here is that uniformitarian principles are applicable case-by-base. Some systems 
act in a relatively regular way. These systems (at least in regards to the way they are regular) are 
well behaved and uniformitarian. Others are more chaotic and such principles do not hold. Of 
course systems can be systematically chaotic: there is a whole range of ways in which regularities 
can hold across systems! And note that these features of systems are empirically investigable, at 
least in principle.  
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So, if there is any special pleading on the part of archaeology about reliance on uniformitarian 
principles, this would require an argument that archaeological targets are more chaotic, irregular 
and labile than biological (or paleoanthropological) ones; there is no in-principle difference. 
4.3 Ethnographies are suspect 
Archaeologists have justifiable concerns about ethnographic data. Many are reports 
compiled by untrustworthy narrators—as Hiscock (2007) details, many of the sources for 
indigenous Australian ethnographies are from 19th Century missionaries, hardly the most 
detached scientists (although some were remarkably even-handed and clear). Moreover, the 
reports are typically qualitative impressions, hardly hard data. Finally, they are carried out by 
anthropologists who have different needs and interests to archaeologists (an anthropologist 
conducting an ethnography is unlikely to pay attention to the connections between material 
culture and, say, religious practices). Holly Hayter, again, summarizes the problems. Ethnographic 
studies are (1) time-limited, (2) based on unreliable informants, (3) based on ambiguous and 
biased data collation: 
Thus, any hypotheses born out of ethnographic data will not necessarily predict what has 
happened in prehistoric times but will more or less regurgitate what the ethnographers 
have stated (42). 
This is a different complaint than that of the last section. There, we were concerned about 
whether our target system admitted of analogous treatments. Here, we are concerned about 
whether the evidence we have about that system is kosher. The first worry was, given some good 
ethnographic data, is that data relevant to our archaeological target. This second worry is 
whether the ethnographic data is good in the first place. 
Historical scientists frequently work under conditions of apparent evidential paucity: it is not 
merely archaeological remains which are biased, ambiguous and fragmentary. Studies of H. 
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floresiensis are marked by degraded, incomplete—and few—specimen. There are the remains of 
13 incomplete hobbit skeletons, and this is a fairly rich find by the standards of 
paleoanthropology. In order for there to be special pleading, it must be that ethnographic data is 
highly biased, ambiguous and fragmentary. There could be something to this: although fossil 
remains of pygmy hippopotamus are incomplete, the hippos will not actively mislead you.  In 5.1, I 
will defend the use of such data in reconstructing the past. 
My aim thus far has been to clarify: just what challenges ethnographic analogies face, and 
what would it take for these challenges to be particular to archaeology. As we have seen, there 
are no epistemic issues unique to archaeological comparative data. Moreover, the license 
depends on facts on the ground. I want to shift to a more normative frame of mind in the last 
section. Here, I will discuss what archaeologists can (and sometimes in fact are) doing about 
these apparent problems. 
5. Local Licence and Comparative Data in Archaeology 
In the last section, I argued that concerns about ethnographic analogies boil down to two 
concerns: issues about evidence, its trustworthiness and stability, and issues about the regularity 
of human cultural behavior and systems. These must be understood to ascertain the evidential 
weight of an ethnographic analogy. Here, I will point to how historical scientists generally 
overcome these problems, and point to where they may, indeed, be problematic.  
5.1 Evidence & Culture 
There are many ways in which historical evidence can be problematic. Downstream traces 
can degrade and so be incomplete. We can lack the required theory to link evidence to the past. 
Evidence can be biased. For ethnographic analogies, the worry is that the ethnographies 
themselves do not truly reflect human societies. And surely, some of the time, they do not, or do 
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so incompletely. I want to make two, perhaps obvious, points about such situations. The first 
concerns methodology, and simply recommends collecting ethnographies that are not only 
better organized, but targeted. The second concerns the epistemic role ethnographic analogies 
play in archaeology. 
Archaeologists have begun collecting their own, and testing, ethnographic data—and this is 
an obvious response to worries about ethnographic evidence. I want to point out a few things 
about this practice. Recall that indirect analogies (and surely most of these archaeological 
ethnographic studies will be indirect—there are so few groups with direct connections 
remaining!) rely upon models that connect features of human life. Like in the biological case, 
these are ceteris paribus on two counts. First, they are not intended to hold across all cases. 
Martin et al’s model is only intended to hold across mammals—there is no discussion of how 
dwarfism is developmentally expressed in birds or fish, for instance. Second, they allow 
exceptions—such models are only intended to hold across typical specimen (see Currie 2015). 
This caveating is necessary for biologists because of the ‘historicity’ of biology11—that is, 
biological systems are highly path dependent (natural selection, after all, can only work with 
what it has). This path dependence means that many regularities across biological systems will be 
highly constrained to particular ancestral groups—regularities, when they occur, will do so within 
shared histories. Potentially, human cultural groups could exhibit historicity writ large—they 
could be highly contingent, and admitting only of localized evidential treatment. But this needs 
to be shown. Showing that, for instance, there is no monolithic ‘hunter-gatherer’ culture does not 
show that there are no exploitable regularities across human groups.  
And so, for direct analogies, we need to know how stable we should expect human culture to 
be. In some cases, not very: given the shear plasticity of human behavior and culture, I worry that 
direct analogies are often not useful. Homologous inferences gain their epistemic warrant, not 
                                                             
11 For discussion of historicity in biology, see Beatty (2006) and Desjardins (2011) 
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only from similarity, but because, for many biological traits, we expect robust inheritance 
channels. We expect this because natural selection requires such channels to build complex 
morphologies, and because developmental systems ensure it. Does something like this hold for 
human culture?  Pessimism on this question may be too quick: human groups maintain channels 
of cultural inheritance by constructing ‘epistemic niches’ which ensure uptake of the right skills 
and beliefs across generations (Sterelny 2003). It may turn out that some aspects of cultural 
inheritance, particularly when buttressed by high fidelity channels (for instance, those 
maintained by song, story and ritual), are extremely robust. Regardless to say, I would like to see 
more study of which aspects of human life are stable over time, and which are not. 
Here is one example of how we might empirically investigate the trustworthiness of 
ethnographies, and the robustness of cultural inheritance. Bernardini (2008) reports that Hopi 
informants are not only able to identify grave goods from a thousand year’s old grave site, but 
also successfully predicated other objects found in the same assemblage. This doesn’t show that 
continuity between the Hopi and the makers of the grave site is doing the work, of course (for 
instance, they could just be very familiar with such sites), but nonetheless presents an interesting 
example of how to test ethnographic reliability12. 
For indirect analogies, we want to know how stable we should expect correspondences 
between environment and cultural traits to be. This, oddly enough, I have more optimism about: 
these correspondences needn’t be determinate, they needn’t be exceptionless. They just need to 
provide evidence. Given how adaptive and flexible human groups are, where there are good 
cultural solutions to problems, we should expect these to crop up often. Overall, then, collecting 
ethnographic data is important for answering such questions, and targeted investigations are 
called for. 
                                                             
12 Thanks to Michelle Turner for the example. 
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The lesson here is that whether we have good ethnographic evidence is an empirically 
tractable question. Archaeologists can study and generate ethnographic material in a way which 
leads to better understanding, and their applicability to reconstructions of past cultures. 
The main problem, I think, with focusing on the evidential shortfalls of ethnographic 
analogies and then concluding that their use is non-evidential, is the nature of confirmation in 
historical science. Even if ethnographic analogy is weak evidence, historical science is all about 
drawing together different strands of weak evidence to build a surprisingly strong whole. Several 
philosophers have emphasized the importance of independent streams of evidence in the 
support of historical science, and it is worth summarizing that work here. 
Alison Wylie (2002, 2011) distinguishes between two forms of independence. Vertical 
independence concerns the relationship between theories which play different roles. Horizontal 
independence concerns different types of evidence, converging on the same hypothesis. I will 
focus on horizontal independence.  
Of necessity, evidential reasoning depends on multiple strands of arguments: it emanates 
from disparate elements of the archaeological record, draws on background knowledge 
that originates in diverse source fields, and bears on an array of conditions and events 
that constitute the complicated lives of the material things that make up the 
archaeological record (Wylie 2011 pp386-387). 
Horizontal independence concerns evidence-streams playing the same role (i.e supporting 
the same hypothesis) from disparate sources. This is seen in the application of different dating 
techniques: 
Consider, for example, evidential arguments that turn on the juxtaposition of measures 
of radiocarbon decay, magnetic orientation, tree ring counts, and stylistic variability over 
time (Ibid, 387). 
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These different measures are independent, and data-convergence reassures us of their 
veracity. Forber & Griffith (2011) make the same point, arguing that historical hypotheses are 
largely justified on these terms. They focus on dating using 14C and tree-ring counting:  
Whatever the insecurities inherent in each line of evidence, their congruence raises the 
credibility of the claims they support insofar as the conditions or assumptions that might 
produce error in a 14C date are not the same as those that might bias a date based on tree 
ring sequences of rates of stylistic change (387-388). 
According to Forber & Griffith, the ability of historical scientists to draw on independent lines 
of evidence undercuts underdetermination problems. As evidence-lines converge, the total 
evidence for a past event increases. The rationale is that different factors are required to 
confound the different measurements. It would be highly unlikely for both 14C data and tree ring 
data to screw up at the same time; and it is more unlikely still for their results to converge in spite 
of this. When horizontally independent lines of evidence converge, the hypothesis that both 
measurements are correct is much more likely than the hypothesis that both are false. This kind 
of reasoning applies to analogies as well: see my (2013) discussion of ‘integrated explanations’, 
which discusses explicitly how analogous and non-analogous information can aid in 
reconstruction. 
The point of all this is to show that historical hypotheses can, in terms of evidential support, 
be more than the sum of their parts. If that is right, then it is a mistake to discount a line of 
evidence, particularly one as potentially important as ethnographies, because the evidence is 
somewhat problematic. Of course, it would be equally foolhardy to prioritize that evidence 
without good reason. Even if ethnographic information is sketchy, it can nonetheless provide an 
important line of evidence to support archaeological hypotheses. 
5.2 Cultural Reconstruction 
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Some archaeological concerns about ethnographic analogy come from beliefs about the 
nature of human cultural systems. The objection that there is no unified, discrete ‘shaman’ 
category is one, and a related complaint is the apparent commitment to uniformitarian principles. 
As we saw in 4.2, however, these objections need to be tempered: ethnographic analogy neither 
requires discrete categories nor strong uniformitarianism. However, different systems behave 
more or less regularly at different levels of description—and the effectiveness of an 
ethnographic analogy depends these features. This requires fine-grained multi-leveled 
examinations of ethnographic data. Moreover, in the last subsection we saw that historical 
reconstruction often involves combining different lines of evidence, and that the consilience of 
individually weak lines can make for robust hypotheses. Happily, Christine VanPool (2009) has 
started just this sort of analysis of Shamanistic practices, and pausing to consider her example is 
illustrative. 
First, VanPool, drawing from anthropological surveys, agrees that ‘Shaman’ is not a discrete 
category: ‘shamanistic’ practices, individualized, idiosyncratic, and involving trance-states, grade 
into more organized ‘priestly’ practices in a non-systematic way. This is no block to the class 
being useful however, VanPool recommends taking shamanism to be a ‘polythetic’ class “… in 
which members share many, but not all of the defining characteristics” (179). This class shades 
into the polythetic class of priests: 
As intuitive as it may seem, however, shamans and priests are not appropriate archetypes 
and do not reflect dichotomous or essentialist “types” in the sense that they are 
immutable states wholly distinct from one another. Instead they are analytically useful 
groupings that reflect the co-occurrence of religious traits that tend to correspond with 
one another as the level of cultural complexity shifts (178). 
Second, VanPool analyses various features of Shamanism, and identifies which features of 
shamanistic systems are more likely to be universal, and those which are more particular. For 
instance, Shamans achieve altered states of consciousness through a variety of methods: 
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psychoactive drugs, chant and ritual, sensory deprivation, and so forth. There are regularities 
about how these methods affect human perception, and these can make a difference to the 
material remains of shamanistic practices. To take one of VanPool’s examples, nicotine 
intoxication effects color perception, excluding the palate to white, yellow and black, while 
peyote produces vivid ‘psychedelic’ experiences. These colors are reflected in shamanistic art 
associated with those drugs. However, although the perceptual experiences generated by 
different methods of achieving altered states are general, how these are understood is culturally 
variable.  
Both entopic images and hallucinations are universal, but their utilization and 
interpretation by shamans… are culturally specific… Understanding the cultural filter 
used to interpret the hallucinations encountered during SSC should be central to the 
anthropology of religion, given that it reflects cultural transmission between the 
practitioners, aspects of a culture’s cosmology, and their view of the spirit world (180). 
Third, VanPool documents various material remains (‘sacra’) which are associated with 
shamanistic practices. These include imagery, including rock art, musical instruments, the remains 
of psychoactive plants, the tools associated with them (pipes for instance) and spaces put aside 
for shamanistic activities. VanPool emphasizes the importance of utilizing these material remains 
as independent lines of evidence for identifying shamanistic practices. For instance, 
… most shamanistic rituals include some form of hallucinogenic agent. Shamanistic sacra 
will therefore be indicated by its association with the agents themselves (e.g., 
macrobotanical remains of datura) and the tools used to administer them (e.g., pipes for 
smoking tobacco). This can be compared with the imagery (e.g., colour symbolism, types 
of images depicted) to determine if they correspond with one another (183). 
In short, it is a mistake to take archaeological evidence atomistically—rather, hypotheses 
need to be considered as a whole and the dependencies between different lines of evidence 
need to be considered. An assemblage consisting of botanical tobacco remains and pipes, as well 
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as white, yellow and black imagery, points clearly towards tobacco-based shamanistic practices. 
This is because the assemblage would be less likely without the presence of shamanism. 
VanPool uses ethnographic data to inform her reconstructions even though (1) the category 
‘shaman’ is not discrete, (2) the anthropological data is sketchy, (3) human societies are complex 
and labile. She is able to do this by analyzing the ethnographic data in a fine-grained manner, 
allowing her to identify which features are likely to be common and which will be culturally 
specific, as well as by integrating the ethnographic data with analyses of material remains, the 
color-palate of rock artists, and psychological details of human perception. In VanPool’s work, we 
see ethnographic analogy take its proper place as just one of our sources of information about 
the past. Understanding its limitations and integrating it with other sources is the secret to 
making ethnographic information relevant to archaeological reconstruction. 
6. Conclusion 
I have argued that ethnographic analogy just is the application of the comparative method to 
human culture and material remains. On this basis, I have revisited the objections archaeologists 
have raised to the use of analogy. I argued that all-encompasing rejection (or acceptance!) of 
ethnographic analogies should themselves be rejected. The action is local. Moreover, even when 
analogies are carried out on the basis of incomplete, biased ethnographies, and even when the 
target systems are highly sensitive to context and exhibit ‘historicity’, ethnographic data can play 
an important role in supporting archaeological hypotheses. They count as one line of evidence 
which archaeologists can exploit. Is there, then, cause for special pleading among 
archaeologists—are there systematic differences between archaeological method, or 
archaeological targets, and their biological analogues? No. In either case, the applicability of both 
inferences along inheritance channels, and models which exploit regularities, is piece-meal and 
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particular. There is no such thing as the licence for ethnographic analogy, but nor is there such a 
thing as the objection to it. 
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